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John W. Dardess 
The Late Ming Rebellions: 
Peasants and Problems of Interpretation 
The Peasant Rebellions of the Late Ming Dynasty. By James Bunyan 
Parsons (Tucson, The University of Arizona Press, 1970) 292 pp. S7.50 
AntifeodaVnaia hot ha kitaiskikh krest'ian vXVllveke. By Larisa Vasil'evna 
Simonovskaia (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1966) 342 pp. R . 1.50 
Wan Ming min-pien. By Li Wen-chih (Hong Kong, Yiian-tung t'u-shu 
kung-ssu, 1966; 1948, 1st ed.) 225 pp. H.K. Si0.00 (reprint) 
In many pre-modern empires, and in some of the more "backward" 
societies of the modern era, epochs of mass violence—broadly styled 
"peasant rebellions"—have at times been the spur behind the rise of 
new but traditional dynastic organizations, or the groundswell lifting 
new elites into control of modernizing nations. Among the more 
successful of such quasi-folk movements in pre-modern times were the 
revolt of Abu Muslim that ultimately made possible the foundation of 
the 'Abbasid Caliphate; the Turkish ghazi movement in Asia Minor, 
which eventually culminated in the Ottoman Empire; and the Red 
Turban rebellions, which in time led to the establishment of the Ming 
Dynasty in China. 
Of the leading peasant rebellions of the modern era, Eric Wolf 
has noted that at some point they usually suffer a takeover by non-
peasant elements, mainly army or political party organizations. In such 
circumstances, the peasant rebel "is an agent of forces larger than 
himself." 1 In many pre-modern instances, too, successful popular move-
ments, lacking society-wide organization or goals "larger than them-
selves," were obliged to come to some sort of terms with the existing 
elite order—the representatives of traditional civilized culture. Some-
times, as in the case of Abu Muslim, other forces first took advantage 
of the popular disturbances, and then crushed them. At other times, a 
popular rebel leader opened himself to elite influence, and, as sultan or 
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emperor, became the founder of a new dynasty rooted in traditional 
elite values. Yet ordinarily, when a popular leader transformed himself 
into a sultan or emperor, and, with the adherence and advice of the 
elite, organized a state, a definite tension developed between his 
original unruly folk followers eager for plunder (army), and his new 
elite supporters, who preferred an orderly administration of taxation 
(bureaucracy). How the ruler managed this tension depended upon 
many factors, especially the elite view of the proper purpose of war. 
In the early Ottoman case, the popular warrior element was, according 
to Wittek, for a while generally pushed to the frontiers to plunder the 
infidel, while Muslim high culture took over in the ruling center.2 
In the case of the early Ming Dynasty, since Confucian high culture did 
not tolerate military expansionism in the style of the jihad, a more force-
ful suppression and containment of the military element was necessary 
in order to frustrate a competing value system and an alternate route to 
social honor and political power. Whatever the precise resolution of 
this tension between army and bureaucracy, the historian should be 
aware of its implications in any study of pre-modern imperial dynastic 
movements of popular origin. Certainly in order to understand the 
final phases of the abortive late Ming rebellions of 1628-1644, a careful 
analysis of this tension and its attempted resolution is crucial. 
With regard to the origins of such pre-modern popular movements, 
another matter presents itself. A particularly vexatious difficulty arises 
from the all too frequent use of the term "peasant rebellion," especially 
in such pre-modern instances as the late Ming cases, where the source 
materials are not always adequate for social analyses of events at the 
popular level. Often in studies of pre-modern uprisings, the term is 
used in a very loose way to designate almost any sort of organized 
violence below the level of a palace coup d'etat, or of provincial elite 
resistance to a ruling center, and sometimes with Marxian overtones 
of class struggle.3 Used in this way, the term is perhaps justifiable if 
one takes the word "peasant" in a holistic, functionally diffuse sense to 
mean any follower of a sub-elite life-style, any denizen of the world of 
the "little tradition," whether or not he happens to work the land. This 
usage, however, is not always helpful. If the term "peasant rebellion" 
2 See Paul Wittek, "Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum," Byzantion, XI 
(1936), 285-319. 
3 For a thorough study of the Marxian understanding of the term, see James P. Harri-
son, The Communists and Chinese Peasant Rebellions, A Study in the Rewriting of Chinese 
History (New York, 1969). 
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is used in a more prccise way, in which by "peasant" one specifically 
understands a person whose main occupation and commitment is 
subsistence (or semi-subsistence) agriculture, then "peasant rebellion" 
would mean a protest made by peasants against injustices which affect 
the normal pursuit of that occupation.4 Many of the peasant troubles 
(jkki) in Tokugawa Japan were rebellious demonstrations of just this 
sort; and Jansen has used the term "peasant rebellion" to describe the 
organized protests made by the peasants of the domain of Tosa in the 
eighteenth century against clearly articulated economic grievances for 
which they held the local authorities responsible.5 Since the term is so 
elastic, it should be incumbent upon any historian using it to define 
what he means by it, especially where, as in the case of the late Ming 
rebellions, the specific peasant role is not immediately evident. 
Three works, recently published or reissued, concern the great 
seventeenth century rebellions in west and central China which brought 
the Ming Dynasty to its knees, only to collapse themselves in the face 
of the Manchu invasion of 1644. Parsons' The Peasant Rebellions of the 
Late Ming Dynasty is a prccise and orderly narrative history buttressed 
by restrained and cautious observations. It tries mainly to show how 
the Ming Dynasty, for all of its military superiority at the earlier 
stages, was unable to contain or to quell the outbreaks; and how the 
rebels, despite their military superiority in the later stages, were unable 
to establish a new successor dynasty to the Ming. Simonovskaia's 
AntifeodaV naia borba kitaiskikh krest'ian v XVII veke [Anti-feudal 
Struggle of the Chinese Peasants in the Seventeenth Century] argues 
that the rebels made a real but unavailing attempt to establish not just 
another dynasty, but a fundamentally new system of government, 
monarchical in form but peasant in content, catering to peasant class 
interests. She attributes its failure to a lack of an intellectual leadership 
capable of translating vague peasant desires into systematic ideology 
and concrete policy. This lack eventually permitted the victory of class 
counterrevolution by the "feudal" elite. Li's Wan Ming min-pien [Late 
Ming Popular Rebellions], mildly sympathetic to the rebels, is of value 
chiefly for the enthusiastic detail and precise documentation that is less 
4 For a discussion of functional diffuseness vs. functional specificity, see Chalmers 
Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston, 1966), 145 ff. 
5 Marius B. Jansen, "Tosa during the Last Century of Tokugawa Rule," in John W . 
Hall and Marius B. Jansen (eds.), Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern fapan 
(Princeton, 1968), 333 ff. The classic work in English on the subject is Hugh Borton, 
Peasant Uprisings in fapan of the Tokugawa Period (New York, 1968). 
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noticeable in Parsons or Simonovskaia. It should be pointed out that 
Parsons has not read Simonovskaia, nor has Simonovskaia read Li. 
Li's factual information is useful in assessing the other two works. 
In what sense were the late Ming rebellions peasant rebellions? 
Simonovskaia provides more help than does Parsons, who fails to 
define the term despite its prominent appearance in the title of his book. 
It seems clear enough, however, that the late Ming rebel leadership 
was never specifically peasant in composition. The rebellions began 
not in any of the core areas of agrarian China, but on the Inner Asian 
frontier in northern Shensi province, an area agriculturally marginal and 
traditionally highly militarized, owing to the necessity of maintaining 
the permanent defenses against the Mongols to the north. Economically 
depressed and politically anarchic by late Ming times, northern Shensi 
served as an asylum for "local bandits" (fu-tsei) and, especially, outlaw 
Ming troops (pien-tsei), who, for lack of rations or other bad treatment, 
and owing to the defeats they suffered in Manchuria, either deserted 
their units singly or mutinied against their officers in groups, taking 
their horses and weapons with them (Li, 15-20, 25-32). It was in 
northern Shensi that, according to Parsons, "the peasant movement 
began and gained the momentum which the Ming authorities never 
succeeded in halting completely" (1). Yet it was the military deserters 
and freebooters gathered along the northern frontier, not the local 
peasants, who took charge of the rebellions that began there. Through-
out the period 1631-1641, which Parsons terms the "disorganized 
raiding phase," the rebellions were really loosely organized congeries 
of raiding bands, their men fully mounted on horseback, increasingly 
capable of using advanced military technology (cannons and gunpow-
der), and so extremely mobile in their mode of operations that one 
suspects them of having adapted some of the nomadic traditions of the 
Mongols on the other side of the Great Wall frontier. That the rebels 
considered themselves politically autonomous at this early stage, and 
did not aim to redress grievances within the Ming system, may be seen 
in their adoption of titles of authority; this the peasant rebels ot 
Tokugawa Japan, who did not consider themselves self-ruling entities, 
apparently never attempted. 
Parsons does not analyze carefully the specific peasant contribution 
to this early phase of the rebellions. Simonovskaia does. She draws a 
clear distinction between a permanent rebel leadership and a temporary, 
or seasonal, peasant following. During the 1620s, the rebel leaders, who 
were completely cut off from the land, maintained themselves in back-
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woods hideouts. From them they made sudden raids on the walled 
towns and outposts of northern Shensi. The local peasants, suffering the 
effects of the increasing impoverishment of the countryside, lent their 
support to these raids. In 1628, however, rebel activity, hitherto spo-
radic, assumed an open and permanent character owing to the outbreak 
of a severe famine which drove so many peasants to the rebel side that 
the hideouts could no longer hold them all. Consequently, the old 
tactic of raid and retreat was no longer possible; the rebel leaders were 
obliged to coordinate their activities and open a broader front. 
Simonovskaia maintains that the dissident peasants consistently chose to 
rally behind the permanent rebels as their leaders, and did not try to 
organize themselves independently (116-118). 
The rebel leaders were soon victimized by the inconstancy of their 
peasant following. Owing to the realization of their immediate de-
mands, or to the severe defeats inflictcd upon them by the Ming forces, 
many northern Shensi peasants deserted their leaders and returned to the 
villages. Meanwhile, the leadership had not only accumulated battle 
experience, but had also grown in size, having absorbed new men who 
were entirely divorced from ordinary peasant life. No longer able to 
operate in Shensi, the rebels moved east into Shansi in 1632. There 
they elaborated a more definite organizational framework. Wang Tzu-
yung, their leader, divided them into thirty-six "camps" a 
strategy designed to spread the rebellion out over the province in order 
to minimize supply problems and maximize peasant adherence. They 
failed, however, to secure Shansi as a permanent base. Parsons suggests 
this was largely because no famine was at hand to produce the requisite 
support (32); Simonovskaia contends that the rebels really received 
more popular support than the sources admit, and that they were driven 
out by the Ming armies, whose large numbers and policy of terror 
succeeded in breaking up rebel-peasant alliances (139). 
In December 1633, the rebels moved from Shansi south into the 
agricultural Hatlands of Honan province. It was here, according to 
Simonovskaia, that the rebel movement showed its limitations most 
strongly. Although the rebels again attracted a large following of local 
peasant youth, they were unable to penetrate and loot the stoutly 
defended walled cities. Forced to confine their operations to the 
countryside, they eventually wrecked the rural economy, and thus 
alienated the peasantry upon whose support they were closely depend-
ent for success (140-141). Despite their attempt to reorganize themselves 
at Ying-yang (Parsons reads it "Jung-yang") in 1635, the rebels were 
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pressed by this circumstance into mutual fragmentation and perpetual 
migration. This situation, as Simonovskaia imaginatively puts it: 
could only satisfy the utterly pauperized part of the peasantry, which 
could do nothing but lead a wandering life in any case. But those 
peasants still tied to the land, and the military deserters who still remem-
bered their ancestral farms, yearned to return to their own homes. The 
time they had spent under the free skies erased their memories of 
previous bondage and fruitless toil. Their hopes for organizing an inde-
pendent economy, which the rebels' victories aroused; the destruction 
of their immediate enemies; the killing of local oppressors; and finally 
their acquisition of a certain amount of property—all this led many 
peasants to leave their armies and return to the land. [170] 
By 1636, the rebellions appeared to be seriously waning; it was chiefly 
the onset of a major new famine, this time in Honan province late in 
1640, that permitted their revival behind a recently emerged leader, 
Li Tzu-ch'eng (Parsons, 66, 81). 
After making this useful distinction between rebel leaders and 
peasant followers, however, Simonovskaia then goes on to blur these 
lines in order to advance the dubious thesis that leaders and followers 
were, after all, united in their basic interests, and that the whole move-
ment constituted peasant class war against landlords and government. 
This twist in part rests upon a convenient semantic confusion of the 
diffuse and specific connotations of the word peasant, particularly as 
they apply to Li Tzu-ch'eng, the rebel leader whose biography is best 
known. Although the sources for Li's early life are various and partly 
conflicting, all generally agree (1) that Li came from a peasant family 
in northern Shensi; and (2) that he neither desired to belong to, nor did 
he identify his interests with, local peasant society. On the contrary, 
after holding a series of petty jobs, none of them connected with 
agriculture, he ran away from home to join a Ming army unit. He 
deserted that unit in 1630, and returned to northern Shensi as an outlaw 
in command of a group of fellow deserters (Parsons, 19-20). He put 
himself first under Wang Chia-yin, a former soldier and early rebel 
leader (Li, 29); then under Kao Ying-hsiang, a professional mounted 
bandit (Li, 52; Simonovskaia, 119, thinks Kao and his men were 
originally animal herders; Parsons, 8, considers him an army deserter). 
By all indications, none of the rebel leaders were peasants specifically 
rebelling as peasants; their rebellion was not a peasant rebellion in the 
specific sense that the Tokugawa ikki were. 
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As ex-soldiers and permanent outlaws, the late Ming rebels evolved 
a predatory and highly militarized ethos, one quite at variance with the 
passive life-style of ordinary peasants. To a striking degree, they appear 
to fit Hobsbawm's generalized "haiduk" model. The Haiduks, a kind 
of outlaw organization once found in Hungary and southeastern 
Europe along the Ottoman frontiers, typify for Hobsbawm "the 
highest form of primitive banditry, the one which comes closest to 
being a permanent and conscious focus of peasant insurrection."6 
A typical "haiduk" band seems to have been a militarized, more or less 
permanent group of outlaws, usually cut off from land, village, or kin 
ties. Their membership consisted of military deserters, fugitives, and 
individual village heroes who were simply unwilling to submit to 
peasant routine, or elements from that manpower surplus which 
marginal peasant societies, according to Hobsbawm, always produce. 
Such groups ordinarily lacked ideology or class consciousness and had 
an ambivalent (rather than permanently hostile) attitude toward outside 
authority; although they shared certain peasant values, such as a hatred 
and distrust of cities, they also tended to be contemptuous of the "inert 
and passive" peasant mass, except in times of rebellion, when "the 
roving bands of outlaw raiders and cossacks on the turbulent frontier 
. . . would coalesce to inspire and lead the gigantic peasant risings.. . . " 7 
Yet it would appear that neither the Haiduks, nor the late Ming rebels, 
possessed any special understanding of peasant needs or grievances, nor 
did either champion any sort of agrarian reform on their own initiative. 
Although peasants flocked to the late Ming rebels periodically in times 
of distress, there is little indication that the rebels were able effectively 
to lead the peasants or to champion their interests. Rather, the dynamic 
of this first phase of the rebellions seems to have required that the 
peasantry uproot itself and adopt the predatory and quasi-nomadic 
rebel style of life. Few peasants, it appears, were willing to do this for 
very long. As cavalrymen, the rebels tended to be contemptuous of 
their peasant recruits, whom they mainly attached as infantry; in some 
cases they had to go so far as to compel peasant recruitment by force 
and brand their conscripts in order to discourage their desertion (Par-
sons, 229-230). T o call the whole movement "peasant rebellion" 
demands, to say the least, serious qualification. 
6 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Bandits (London, 1969), 62. 
7 Ibid., 7 1 . 
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Between 1641 and 1644, the rebellions in central and west China under-
went a transformation from an essentially sub-political raiding opera-
tion into a dynastic movement ultimately aimed at replacing the Ming. 
Yet it was so weakly developed that although Li Tzu-ch'eng's forces 
captured Peking in April 1644, forcing the imperial court to evacuate, 
his whole movement collapsed under outside pressure only two months 
later. Parsons advances two general reasons for this sudden collapse. 
He first states that the rebellions lacked the popular base that a messianic 
religious message might have given them: 
Viewed entirely as a phenomenon of peasant unrest, the greatest weak-
ness of the late Ming rebellions was the lack of any esprit-building and 
charisma-providing factors, such as a messianic belief with roots in a 
folk religion. Consequently, the late Ming rebellions, possessing rela-
tively unimportant religious overtones, lacked the strength of the 
peasant movement at the end of the Yuan when the White Lotus doc-
trine provided a dynamic impetus and a foundation. [259] 
Here a few dissenting remarks may be in order. There is no reason 
to believe that the messianic religious ideology that inspired the riots 
of 1351-1354 was any more effective in mobilizing permanent peasant 
support than the non-religious "haiduk" ethos of the late Ming rebels. 
Late Yuan religious messianism was not specifically a peasant manifesta-
tion; it was developed and most strongly espoused among heretic 
monks, artisans, peddlers, and people on the fringes of legitimate 
society. Its hold on the legitimate peasantry proved to be of short 
duration. Moreover, Chu Yuan-chang, the Ming founder, did not 
emerge into the limelight of power as a prospective dynast until well 
after the messianic riots had run their course. His military power was 
not built on the fervor of former messianic rebels, but grew mainly by 
the recruitment and amalgamation of gentry-led and peasant-manned 
village self-defense systems.8 
Parsons's second answer is more promising, and, unlike the first, 
is derived from the overall argumentation of his book. His conclusion 
is that an unintelligent rebel leadership neglected to establish a secure 
base area and, moreover, dominated a movement which had only 
minimal backing from the gentry elite: 
Viewed more generally, the most fundamental reasons for the defeat 
of the rebellions were their failure to attract gentry support, and closely 
8 Cf. John W . Dardess, "The Transformations of Messianic Revolt and the Founding 
of the Ming Dynasty," Journal of Asian Studies, X X I X (1970), 539-558. 
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related, their neglect to develop secure strength in a base area before 
attempting to seize national power. The failure to attract gentry support 
was mainly due to the limited and lowly backgrounds of the rebel 
leaders, as well as their relative lack of native ability, which made it 
impossible for them to display the political wisdom necessary to gain a 
following. The late Ming rebellions had no peasant genius like Chu 
Yuan-chang. Furthermore, the long-surviving rebel leaders, mostly 
natives of northern Shensi, who monopolized the top positions of 
leadership . . . had a vested interest in maintaining a firm grasp on the 
dominant positions and could not bring themselves to share power with 
a gentry group. Had rebel leadership been more diverse, it would have 
been possible for a gentry faction to have exerted influence. Also, if Li 
had been able to maintain his position in Peking for a longer period than 
he did, he would have had more success in building up a gentry 
following. 
This conclusion is carefully put, yet it is more descriptive than analytical. 
Of the numerous analytical problems which it raises, one of the simpler 
asks why, from the point of view of its basic internal relationships, Li 
Tzu-ch'eng's dynastic effort failed. 
Li's emergence as an aspiring ruler hinged on three main factors: 
famine and ruin in Honan province; the disintegration of the Ming 
armies; and, in these circumstances, Li's ability to penetrate major 
walled cities for the first time. In the view of a few fringe members of 
the Honan gentry, the prevailing conditions of anarchy and desolation 
held the possibility that the rebel movement might be transformed from 
an engine of destruction into an agent of pacification and order. Acting 
on this assumption, a few gentry first made contact with Li in 1641 when 
he temporarily captured the city of Lo-yang. 
It is important to note, however, that it was gentry dissidents, not 
men of the social or political mainstream, that came to the rebel chief 
Li Tzu-ch'eng. They were not men in firm control of their local vil-
lages or districts. For example, Li's leading gentry adherent, Li Yen, 
was highly unpopular among his peers in his home county in Honan, 
in part because his father had been a high court adherent of the notorious 
eunuch dictator Wei Chung-hsien (fl. 1620-1627), and probably even 
more because he supplied free grain to the destitute peasantry. It was 
Li Yen who, as Parsons puts it, "started a deliberate campaign to cir-
culate popular slogans which would create for Li Tzu-ch'eng a new 
image and win him widespread support" (93). The slogans included 
demands for land equalization, tax cancellation, and fair prices. If only 
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on a verbal level, Li Tzu-ch'eng's movement began in 1641 to shift 
from a sophisticated form of banditry into something resembling bona 
fide peasant rebellion. The shift was, however, more apparent than real, 
for it appears that the major part of the Honan gentry was unwilling 
to commit itself and its peasant clients to Li Tzu-ch'eng and consolidated 
village self-defense systems instead (cf. Li, 103-104, 144m). 
At the city of Hsiang-yang in 1643, Li Tzu-ch'eng strengthened his 
military leadership and established his first civilian bureaucracy, both 
with gentry aid. The politicization of the rebel movement and its 
surface commitment to peace and order at this time may be seen in Li 
Tzu-ch'eng's assumption of royal title and in his publicly announced 
goal of rescuing the people from their suffering under Ming misrule.9 
His army, he now asserted, had been "farming for ten generations" and 
was "altogether good" (Parsons, 219). A particularly telling symbol 
of Li's new order was his honorific and benevolent treatment of the 
local Ming princes—previously a favorite target of rebel rapine and 
cruelty (Li, 120). The new order failed, however, to attract massive 
gentry support and was exceedingly unstable. The restructuring of the 
rebel army into a centralized organ responsive to directives from the 
top generated resentment, for old ties of loyalty between leaders and 
men were partly ruptured in the process, and the rebels were resistant 
to centralized discipline and control (cf. Parsons, 106-113 , 226; Li, 
113-120). It may have been military restlessness that prompted the 
plan, argued out entirely by Li's gentry advisers, to evacuate Hsiang-
yang and make an attack on the Ming capital of Peking by way of 
Shensi and Shansi (cf. Parsons, 1 1 2 ; Li, 124-125). 
After leaving Hsiang-yang, Li's army and government made a 
temporary stop in the Shensi provincial capital of Sian (November 
1643-February 1644). Li was more successful here in gaining further 
gentry support and in establishing administrative control at the local 
level. At Sian, Li paid well-publicized calls on the aged, issued coinage, 
and held his own civil service examinations, thus further identifying 
his movement with the elite traditions of government and morality. 
This trend was capped by the formal declaration of a dynasty, the Ta 
9 Li earlier succeeded to the rebel title cWuang wang after the decease o f a superior who 
held it before him. Often translated "Dashing Prince/ ' the title carries a strong overtone 
of violent action. It did not imply a claim to political rule over society, but rather to 
leadership within the rebel group. In 1643, Li took the title Hsin-shun wang, which did 
have political implications of a wider sort. This title may perhaps be translated: "Prince 
Who is Renovated and Compliant" (i.e., compliant with the will o f Heaven and the 
desires of the people). 
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Shun. The rebel military, which had no part in this dynastic movement, 
was in part mollified by the grant of noble titles and even more by 
the institution of legalized plunder—a device initiated here and fully 
worked out in Peking a few months later (cf. Parsons, 120-123). 
Li Tzu-ch'eng's march on Peking met little opposition, and Peking 
itself fell to him in April 1644. On the march, the tensions within Li's 
movement were not fully evident, for the common goal of taking 
Peking seems to have served as a binding influence. The troops were 
well-behaved along the way, no doubt restrained by the greater pros-
pects of loot in the capital city. Li's civilian supporters may have hoped 
that the last Ming emperor, seeing that all was lost, might abdicate 
(.shan-jang) his dynasty and the Mandate of Heaven to Li and thus give 
an incalculable boon to the elite-oriented bureaucratic element within 
Li's movement.10 If that were their hope, they were cheated by the last 
Ming emperor's dramatic suicide. In any event, the latent internal 
dichotomy between the civilian officials and the rebel military widened 
not long after Peking was taken. 
Weak as it was, the civilian side tried to divert the rebellion into 
traditional bureaucratic channels with Li Tzu-ch'eng as Confucian 
emperor and supreme bureaucrat. The military side, though itself 
internally divided, pushed in the opposite direction and struggled to 
preserve the original "haiduk" goals of predation and rape, with Li 
Tzu-ch'eng as bandit king and supreme war leader. Circumstances 
dictated that the military side should prevail, and that the civilian side 
yield. 
The civilian side in Li's movement was not powerful enough to 
reinstitute the traditional tax-collecting apparatus, which required local 
gentry cooperation. Wealth was, nonetheless, gathered, and it is 
important to note how it was done. In central and northern China, over 
which Li Tzu-ch'eng exerted some semblance of control from his new 
capital in Peking, various former Ming officials were sent out to serve 
as magistrates in the walled administrative cities. In conjunction with 
detachments of Li's army, these magistrates forcibly extracted money 
and supplies from the local rich, mainly gentry and other former 
officials (Li, 143). It was precisely this latter group that the traditional 
Ming tax regime had overlooked, refused to tax heavily despite its 
pressing need for finances (cf. Parsons, 56), and all along had been a 
favored victim of rebel plunder. 
10 I have here adapted a suggestion made by Ray Huang in his review of Parson's 
book in the Journal of Asian Studies, X X X (1970), 175-176. 
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The civilian-military compromise inherent in this arrangement 
was more strikingly visible at the center, in Peking. There we find that 
Li Tzu-ch'eng had built a large central bureaucracy, staffed mainly by 
former Ming officials who were found on investigation to be honest, 
and more important, relatively poor. But the powerlessness of this 
bureaucracy is evidenced by the fact that it was put under the direction 
of one of Li Tzu-ch'eng's generals, who was thereby able to ensure that 
the overall policy for the regime should reflect basic military interests. 
This meant that the bureaucracy had to subordinate its own goals to 
those of the military, and act either as an arm of the military or not at 
all. As the bridge between the civilian bureaucracy on the one hand and 
the rebel military on the other, Li Tzu-ch'eng's old gentry adherent, 
Li Yen, worked mightily to save the situation. His formula for keeping 
the whole movement in one piece consisted essentially in rationalizing 
and legalizing the rebel instinct for plunder by drawing up carefully 
graded schedules designating which persons were to be arrested and 
what part of their wealth was to be seized (Parsons, 136-137; Li, 
141-142). His apparent intent was to put the military under civilian 
guidance by involving the bureaucracy in its looting operations. 
Li Yen's effort was, however, in vain, for he could not compel the 
military to follow his schedules and refrain from casual and unauthorized 
plunder. His appeal to Li Tzu-ch'eng in this matter was of no avail. To 
the rebel military, Li Tzu-ch'eng was merely a Shensi outlaw like them-
selves; they were profoundly hostile to his imperial pretensions. As one 
leading general reportedly said, "I'll salute him as one bandit to another, 
I'll not bend my knee!" (Li, 165). Pressed by Li Yen, Li Tzu-ch'eng 
urged his generals to observe the norms set down by the bureaucracy. 
The generals, however, would have none of it. One of them "openly 
stated to Li Y e n . . . that he was chiefly concerned with preventing 
mutinies among the troops and would not pay any great heed to the 
people. Even when Li Tzu-ch'eng appealed to . . . the rebel command-
ers, still suffering from a freebooters' psychology, to restrain their 
troops, no real results were gained. The commanders frankly told Li 
that, having gained the empire for him, they should now be allowed 
to enjoy and enrich themselves" (Parsons, 134). 
The proceeds of plunder, thinly legalized by the bureaucrats, 
passed up the line and into the pockets of privates, sergeants, and 
generals. After two months of this, the troops had enough and were 
eager to return to their home areas. Discipline slackened. There was 
no enthusiasm among them for fighting Wu San-kuei, who, with his 
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Manchu allies, was approaching Peking in the first step of the Ch'ing 
conquest of China. They had no desire to defend Peking; defeated by 
Wu, they made a disorderly evacuation of the capital and scattered 
homeward, dragging their booty with them. Thus did Li Tzu-ch'eng's 
empire collapse at its apparent apogee of power. 
The unexamined use of the term "peasant rebellion" easily leads to 
confusion over just who rebels and why. In the late Ming case, the 
evidence seems to suggest that what actually took place was a kind of 
military insurrection rather than a peasant rebellion. It might be argued 
that the inadequate resources of the Ming Dynasty, relative to the size 
of its army early in the seventeenth century, in effect forced part of that 
army to turn outlaw and fend for itself.11 Although the intermittent 
outbreak of famine (Shensi in 1628, Honan in 1640) provided these 
ex-soldier rebels with the opportunity, or, perhaps better, necessity of 
expanding their operations, there is no indication that these expanded 
operations were in any but the most tenuous way connected with 
specifically agrarian revolt within peasant society. However, until the 
social and economic history of northern China in Ming times becomes 
better known, and until we have a better general idea of the possible 
forms of peasant-military relationships, particularly in pre-modern 
times, our understanding of the late Ming rebellions will be incomplete. 
Second, the evolution of quasi-military freebooting operations into 
essentially civilian, elite-oriented dynastic movements, particularly 
under conditions of anarchy where the largely apolitical freebooters 
happen to be the only group in effective possession of the means of 
violence, is not an unknown historical phenomenon. Moreover, a 
comparative view of such cases suggests that there is every reason for 
such a transition to fail, especially where, as in the late Ming case, there 
was so little time in which to carry it through. The evolution of the 
Ottoman system took generations; and, after a century of development, 
even it temporarily fell apart when defeated by Tamerlane in 1402. 
11 For late Ming problems of military finance and supply, see Ray Huang, "Fiscal 
Administration during the Ming Dynasty," in Charles O. Hucker (ed.), Chinese Govern-
ment in Ming Times (New York, 1969), 1 1 7 ff. Huang has also registered his doubts as to 
whether the late Ming rebellions were in fact peasant rebellions (126-127). 
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Just as the Ottoman sultan was the creation of the civilian 4ulama, and 
not of the freebooting ghazis, Li Tzu-ch'eng's "dynastic aspirations" 
were fed by his gentry adherents, and not by his rebel comrades. This, 
incidently, was also true of Chu Yuan-chang's foundation of the Ming 
Dynasty in 1368. In each case, the crucial point of tension was reached 
when civilian elites attempted to take over and reorganize the older 
movements. An analysis of Li Tzu-ch'eng's movement in these civilian 
versus military terms leads, I think, to a better explanation for the 
dramatic and sudden collapse of his dynasty than the summary con-
clusions of Parsons or the Marxian class-counterrevolution hypothesis 
of Simonovskaia. 
There are at least two major ways in which rebel movements may 
be approached historically. They may be considered as symptoms of 
dysfunction within the larger social and political order in which they 
originate and play out their history, or they may be treated as autono-
mous power-seeking organizations with their own peculiar and unique 
lines of development. Neither approach can be entirely satisfactory 
without reference to the other. A historical treatment of a period of 
rebellion which takes all of society as its canvas may tend to relegate 
dissident activity to symptom, and from symptom the path first to 
conceptual typology and then to undynamic stereotype is all too easy 
to take. Chalmers Johnson's typology of revolutionary behavior, useful 
though it may be to historical research, has one serious limitation. It 
sorts out concrete instances of rebellion into idealized types, using the 
predominant ideological characteristics of the rebellious group as one 
main means of identification (thus the Jacquerie, the Millenarian Rebel-
lion, etc.), and assumes that all members of a single rebellious group 
possess a single ideology and remain true to it from the inception of 
violence until its end.12 Yet since in fact one finds that rebel movements 
may at times shift their goals, transform their ideology, take on new and 
different members, and appeal to new constituencies, one cannot simply 
assign a plausible typological tag ("peasant rebellion") to an entire rebel 
movement and go no further. One must also analyze the inner develop-
ment and consequent inner tensions of the rebellion itself. 
The present essay argues the need for a closer study of the internal 
12 Sec Johnson's Revolution and the Social System (Stanford, 1964). An excellent and 
instructive example of the large-scale historical treatment of rebellion from a com-
parative point of view is Roland Mousnier, Fureurs Paysannes. Les Paysans dans les 
Rholtes du XVIIe Siecle France, Russie, Chine) (Paris, 1967). Mousnier's analysis of the 
late Ming rebellions draws heavily upon Parsons's earlier studies in article form. 
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dynamic of rebellion, a sharply and indeed narrowly focused approach 
which die late Ming rebellions, for one, still await. Rebel organizations 
are, after all, in many ways miniature polities. They have a certain 
political hierarchy and political goals, control territory, and maintain 
themselves by various rudimentary fiscal processes. No less than legiti-
mate states, rebel politics may suffer "dysfunctions"; rebel chiefs may 
find themselves subject to conflicting pressures from below as their 
goals and strategies shift in response to new situations. One ought to 
be aware that rebels are not only sociological types, but also men; and 
that rebel movements, especially those that do not succeed in that 
ultimate act of self-preservation, the founding of a new and legitimate 
regime, may still transcend mere opera bouffe and stake a serious claim 
as history. The sharply focused approach will certainly help elucidate 
rebel history; it may also open new avenues of understanding to the 
larger social and political environments in which rebellious movements 
take place. 
